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ABSTRACT
We analyze the impact of the probabilistic nature of patents on the functioning of Germany’s bifurcated
patent litigation system where infringement and validity of a patent are decided independently by dif-
ferent courts. We show that bifurcation creates situations in which a patent is held infringed that is
subsequently invalidated. Our conservative estimates indicate that 12% of infringement cases in which
the patent’s validity is challenged produce such ‘invalid but infringed’ decisions. We also show that hav-
ing to challenge a patent’s validity in separate court proceedings means that more resource-constrained
alleged infringers are less likely to do so. We find evidence that ‘invalid but infringed’ decisions create
uncertainty which firms that were found to infringe an invalid patent attempt to reduce by filing more
oppositions against newly granted patents immediately afterwards.
KEYWORDS: Litigation, innovation, patents, bifurcation, Germany
∗We acknowledge financial support for the creation of the dataset used in this research by the ZEW SEEK
‘Patent Litigation in Europe’ project. Dietmar Harhoff acknowledges support from the DFG Collaborative
Research Program SFB/TR 15 (Project C2). We thank Max Ernicke and Dieter Stauder for advice on the
legal aspects of this study. We also thank Christoph Ann, Deepak Hedge, Filipe Fischmann, Annette Kur,
Brian Love, Malwina Mejer, Petra Moser and Roberto Romandini for helpful comments. Christian Helmers
thanks various lawyers at the JurisTisch for generously sharing their views on the German patent litigation
system. The paper was presented at the 2012 Patstat Conference in Paris, the 5th ZEW/MaCCI Conference
on the Economics of Innovation and Patenting, a seminar organized by the UK Intellectual Property Office,
the IPSC 2014 at Berkeley, the Munich Conference on Innovation and Competition 2014, the 9th Annual
Conference of the EPIP Association, and the 41st Annual Conference of the EARIE 2014. Corresponding
author: chelmers@scu.edu.
1 Introduction
Patents are probabilistic property rights: there is inherent uncertainty regarding a patent’s
validity and scope (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). Although patents are granted by patent
offices only after substantive examination, there is no guarantee that a granted patent is
in fact valid.1 In most legal systems, such as the U.S. or UK, infringement and invalidity
of a patent are decided simultaneously where infringement is only possible if the patent is
upheld in the same proceeding.2 In a bifurcated patent litigation system such as in Ger-
many, in contrast, separate courts decide on infringement and validity independently of
each other. In practice, the decision on infringement is often made and enforced before
validity has been determined under the presumption that granted patents are indeed valid.
This means that a bifurcated enforcement system prioritizes resolving uncertainty regard-
ing infringement. This has advantages, perhaps most importantly it leads to fast decisions
on patent infringement. But because patents are probabilistic rights, this can lead to situa-
tions in which a patent is held infringed that is subsequently invalidated. Our objective is to
quantify empirically the extent to which bifurcation creates such ‘invalid but infringed’ de-
cisions and explore potential implications of the uncertainty that they create. As such, our
analysis explores implications of the probabilistic nature of patents for the optimal design
of patent enforcement systems.
In Germany, jurisdiction for patent infringement lies with twelve regional courts, while
patent validity is decided solely by the patent offices (European Patent Office – EPO – or
German Patent and Trademark Office – DPMA) during the opposition phase and by the Ger-
man Federal Patent Court (BPatG) afterwards. Commonly, claims for invalidity are filed in
response to the alleged infringement of a patent, that is, the invalidity action at the BPatG
usually follows the infringement action. Deciding on the issue of infringement, German
courts presume validity of a patent and in most cases proceed with a decision on infringe-
ment regardless of a pending validity challenge.3 This means a patent may be found in-
fringed and hence an injunction granted – that is often preliminary, yet fully enforceable –
before the validity of the patent has been determined. The duration of this so-called ‘injunc-
tion gap’ can be considerable. This can produce a paradoxical situation in which a patent
can be legally enforced although it is subsequently invalidated.
Table 1 lists a number of cases that have received attention in the media as the patents
in dispute were held infringed but later invalidated.4 A patent dispute between HTC and
IPCom provides an example of a patent (EP1186189) that was found infringed in first in-
stance, but subsequently invalidated by the BPatG. IPCom was granted a preliminary in-
junction against HTC in early 2009, which would have forced HTC to stop selling its 3G
mobile phones in Germany. HTC appealed against the injunction and in late 2010, the
BPatG invalidated IPCom’s patent. Another recent example of a decision on infringement
while the decision on validity was still pending is the injunction forcing Apple to de-activate
1Mann and Underweiser (2012) for example show that the U.S. Federal Circuit has held nearly 60% of
patents considered since 2003 invalid.
2This assumes that the alleged infringer raises invalidity as a defense, which is common practice in these
legal systems (see Cremers et al. (2013) for evidence on the UK).
3German courts stay infringement proceedings pending an invalidity proceeding only if there is strong
reason to believe the validity challenge will be successful (see Section 2).
4Table A-4 in the Appendix provides more examples drawn from our data.
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its email push service in its iOS handhelds in Germany (EP0847654).5 These cases are not
confined to disputes between large players in the much-cited ‘smartphone patent wars.’ For
example, there is the case between Dr. Johannes Heidenhain GmbH and iC-Haus GmbH,
a medium-sized German company, at the Regional Court Düsseldorf. Disregarding a pend-
ing opposition of a European patent (EP1168120) at the EPO, the court found the patent
infringed in December 2007 and ordered iC-Haus GmbH to disclose sensitive business and
financial information. The EPO invalidated the patent in March 2013.
Our empirical analysis confirms the anecdotal evidence – bifurcation creates ‘invalid but
infringed’ situations in which a court finds infringement of a patent that is subsequently
invalidated. We collect detailed case-level data from German courts to construct a compre-
hensive, novel dataset on infringement and invalidity proceedings for 2000 to 2008. Using
these data, we find that 12% of infringement cases with parallel invalidity proceedings pro-
duce such divergent decisions. In a total of 142 cases, patents were held infringed that were
(partially) invalidated. Our analysis also shows that the length of the potential injunction
gap is substantial. In cases where validity was challenged before the BPatG, the infringe-
ment decision was on average enforceable for more than a year before the patent was in-
validated in first instance. In cases in which validity was challenged before the DPMA/EPO,
the length of the injunction gap is almost three times as large. This offers clear evidence
that the injunction gap is a reality that offers scope for patent holders to temporarily enforce
invalid patents.
We also show that bifurcation reduces the likelihood that an alleged infringer challenges
a patent’s validity. Because challenging the validity of a patent requires a separate action
at a different court, the alleged infringer may refrain from doing so despite the potential
invalidity of a patent. We find evidence that in particular smaller firms are less likely to
file an invalidity action at the BPatG when they are sued for infringement. The effect is
robust to controlling for various time varying and invariant patent-, litigant-, and case-
level characteristics. This suggests that more resource-constrained firms are less likely to
challenge a patent’s validity. The implications of this ‘screening effect’ are twofold: on the
one hand the share of cases where an infringed patent is invalidated is downward biased,
on the other the strong presumption of validity that is built into the bifurcated litigation
system becomes self-reinforcing.
The possibility of infringing an invalid patent and a lower likelihood of facing a coun-
terclaim for invalidation favor disproportionately the patent holder suing for infringement.
If patents serve as an incentive mechanism to encourage investments in innovation, strong
rights to enforce a patent against alleged infringers may be even socially desirable. How-
ever, bifurcation can also create uncertainty. The main argument is that the likelihood to
be found to infringe an invalid patent is higher in a bifurcated system than in a system
where validity and infringement are assessed in the same proceedings. While the time lag
between the decisions on infringement and validity in itself creates uncertainty for the lit-
igants, more fundamentally, the increased likelihood of being found to infringe an invalid
patent creates additional uncertainty for firms when navigating the patent landscape. Po-
tentially, this could have important effects on the innovative activity as well as patenting
behavior of firms and their performance. For example, firms that have fallen into the injunc-
tion gap might adapt their assessment of the likelihood of facing an injunction despite the
5On appeal, however, the Higher Regional Court Karlsruhe decided to stay the proceeding until a decision
in the parallel invalidity proceeding became available.
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invalidity of allegedly infringed patents. Such changes in perceptions remain unobservable
to us.6 However, we can test whether they manifest themselves in changes in opposition
behavior of alleged infringers. That is, we test whether firms subject to a divergent decision
oppose more patents immediately following this experience. Our results shows that alleged
infringers are indeed more likely to file oppositions after they have experienced a divergent
decision. We interpret this as evidence that firms attempt to preempt similar situations in
the future by eliminating potentially threatening patents early on. This finding is consistent
with the fact that German firms are overall responsible for a disproportionately large share
of oppositions at the EPO, and suggests that this partly reflects the uncertainty created by
the bifurcated litigation system.
Our research contributes to the existing literature on the design and functioning of
patent enforcement systems by offering for the first time quantitative evidence on the im-
plications of bifurcation. This is not only of direct relevance to Germany, where by far
the largest number of patent cases in Europe are litigated,7 but also plays an important
role in the current heated discussion about the design of the Unified Patent Court (UPC)
in Europe. For example, a group of large firms across industries, including Adidas, Apple,
Deutsche Post DHL, Google, and Samsung,8 issued a joint statement in February 2014 voic-
ing concerns that “[...] the potential exists for a court to order an injunction prohibiting
the importation and sale of goods even though the patent may ultimately be found invalid.
This result unduly reduces competition, can increase the cost of products in the market and
reduce product choices, all negatively impacting consumers.”
Apart from its relevance for Germany and the European UPC, our research may pro-
vide important lessons also for countries that rely on similar bifurcated litigation systems,
including some of the world’s top patenting countries, such as China, Japan, and Korea.
It also informs jurisdictions that currently do not separate infringement and validity deci-
sions. In the U.S., for example, the validity of roughly a third of litigated patents in 2013
was challenged through an Inter Partes Review (IPR) before the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office.9 Because an IPR has to be concluded within one year whereas infringement cases
usually drag on a lot longer, one could argue that this has pushed de facto the U.S. sys-
tem towards bifurcation, albeit bifurcation in which validity is decided first.10 Instituting
bifurcation where validity is decided first may in fact produce potential benefits of sepa-
rating invalidity and infringement decisions (see Section 3) while avoiding the problems
associated with the German type of bifurcation.
6There is, however, anecdotal evidence. For example, in April 2012, Microsoft announced the relocation
of its European logistics center from Germany to the Netherlands citing the threat of a possible injunction
due to the alleged infringement of a Motorola patent (various news sources including Reuters, the Wall Street
Journal, and the Financial Times, 2 April 2012.) Microsoft appeared to consider the risk of facing an injunction
to be considerably higher in Germany than in the Netherlands, presumably because of the bifurcated litigation
system.
7Cremers et al. (2013) show that depending on how cases are counted (e.g. counting infringement and
invalidity cases as separate cases or not) the total number of patent cases in Germany is between 12 and 29
times larger than in the UK.
8The complete list is: Adidas, AFDEL, Apple, ARM, BlackBerry, Broadcom, Bull, Cisco Systems, Dell,
Deutsche Post DHL, ESIA, Google, HP, Huawei, Microsoft, Samsung, SFIB, Telecom Italia, and Vodafone.
9IPR was introduced by the America Invents Act (AIA) in September 2012 as a way of challenging validity
administratively post-grant.
10A party that has challenged a patent’s validity through IPR cannot raise the same objections subsequently
in court. This creates significant barriers to challenging validity again in court if a patent survives IPR.
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Taking a broader perspective, our evidence underscores the probabilistic nature of patents.
We show that patents that a court presumes valid when deciding on infringement often turn
out to be invalid upon closer scrutiny. Patents involved in court disputes are only the tip
of the patent iceberg and clearly a non-random selection. Regardless, our evidence sup-
ports the general view that legal rights in form of patents are inherently associated with
enormous uncertainty. We also show that bifurcation compounds the undersupply of va-
lidity challenges in court that has been shown to exist in non-bifurcated systems (Farrell
and Merges, 2004). This means that the strong presumption of validity of a probabilistic
right, which is built into the bifurcated litigation system, plays out to the patent holder’s
advantage. This offers empirical evidence directly relevant for the long-standing, largely
theoretical debate on the optimal design of patent (enforcement) systems (Aoki and Hu,
1999; Ayres and Klemperer, 1999; Crampes and Langinier, 2002; Boyce and Hollis, 2007;
Eckert and Langinier, 2013).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a detailed
description of the German patent litigation system with particular focus on the interplay
of infringement and invalidity proceedings. Section 3 discusses the benefits of a system
with a strong, built-in presumption of validity but also the legal discrepancies that it can
create which may translate into increased uncertainty for firms. Section 4 describes the data
used in our analysis. Section 5 presents our findings and Section 6 offers some concluding
thoughts and suggestions for further research.
2 Germany’s Bifurcated Patent Litigation System
This section explains the design of the German bifurcated patent litigation system with
a focus on the legal framework that can lead to divergent decisions in infringement and
invalidity proceedings.
2.1 Court System
Regional courts (Landgerichte – LG) have jurisdiction over patent infringement.11 There are
twelve regional courts that serve as first instance courts in infringement proceedings.12 A
panel of three judges decide on infringement. These judges are trained legal professionals
that very rarely have any technical training (Ann, 2009). Decisions of the regional courts
can be appealed before a higher regional court (Oberlandesgericht – OLG). In exceptional
cases, a further appeal can be brought before the Patent Division of the German Federal
Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH) in third instance.
The validity of a patent is challenged through opposition procedures at the patent of-
fice that has granted the patent right (European Patent Office – EPO – for EP patents or
Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt – DPMA – for DE patents) and invalidity proceedings be-
fore the German Federal Patent Court (Bundespatentgericht – BPatG). The responsibilities
11Infringement claims must be based on a patent granted by the DPMA (DE) or the EPO with effect for
Germany (EP).
12Namely, the Regional Courts Berlin, Braunschweig, Düsseldorf, Erfurt, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig,
Magdeburg, Mannheim, Munich, Nuremberg-Fürth and Saarbrücken. Each regional court has at least one
chamber primarily designated to patent cases.
6
of the BPatG are twofold. It serves as the appeals court for decisions of the DPMA con-
cerning DE patent applications, and it hears invalidity actions for DE and EP (with effect
for Germany) patents. As a specialized court, the BPatG deploys legally as well as techni-
cally trained judges.13 Appeals to the decisions by the BPatG are directly brought before
the Patent Division of the BGH that reviews infringement proceedings. The structure of the
German court system is summarized in Figure A-1 in the Appendix.
Infringement
A patent holder initiates the infringement proceeding by filing an infringement action. The
patent holder can seek different forms of legal relief; for example, a cease and desist order to
halt the infringing act, the recall and destruction of infringing goods, rendering of account
to identify distribution channels and calculate damages, or damages for losses suffered. The
patent holder can also request a preliminary injunction against the alleged infringer. How-
ever in practice, preliminary injunctions are rare because they require clear-cut evidence
regarding the infringing act, the validity of the patent, and urgency (Kühnen, 2012).14
The main oral hearing takes place roughly between five to twelve months after the
action was filed. Main oral hearings rarely exceed one day and often last for only a few
hours. In case of a parallel validity challenge, the judges may grant the request to stay the
proceeding until a decision on the patent’s validity is available (see Section 2.2 below). If
the infringement action is not stayed, the judges hand down a written judgment usually four
to ten weeks after the main oral hearing, which concludes the proceeding in first instance.
Alternatively, the litigants may settle at any time during the proceeding. The ‘winner’ can
demand the reimbursement of legal costs from the losing party.15
In the proceeding, the defendant may dispute the infringement allegations, but the pos-
sible invalidity of a patent does not constitute an admissible defense. The alleged infringer
has to challenge the patent’s validity through a separate opposition or invalidity action.
Invalidity
The alleged infringer may challenge a granted patent through opposition or, subsequently,
an invalidity action. An opposition to an EP (DE) patent can be filed at the EPO (DPMA)
within the first 9 months (3 months) after grant of the patent. After this period, the alleged
infringer may still join an already pending opposition proceeding. It is noteworthy that
the EPO and DPMA may continue the proceeding ex officio and decide on validity even if
the opponent withdraws the opposition. If invalidated, the patent is deemed void counting
from its grant date.16 Each litigant usually bears his own costs of the opposition proceeding.
13The panel consists of five judges: three technically trained judges as well as two legally trained judges.
14An injunction might be granted, for example, if the suspected infringer is about to start selling a product
that clearly infringes a patent that is most likely valid and where selling the infringing product would result
in substantial losses for the patent holder. That said, although there has been a recent increase in the number
of preliminary injunctions (Müller-Stoy and Wahl, 2008), they are still a relatively rare occurrence in patent
litigation (Böhler, 2011).
15Legal costs include court fees, attorney-at-law as well as patent attorney fees, and further expenses, such
as travel or translation costs. Attorneys may charge their clients significantly higher fees than those eligible
for reimbursement, thus legal costs are not always shifted entirely to the losing party.
16Note that for EP patents, the decision has effect in all states where the opposed patent is in force.
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After the end of the opposition phase, or – in case of an opposition – after the end of
the opposition proceeding, validity can be challenged only through an invalidity action at
the BPatG. Although an invalidity action can be filed by any person or legal entity, almost
all invalidity actions are filed in response to infringement actions.17
Unlike in opposition proceedings, the plaintiff has full discretion to withdraw his action
at any time. As in the case of oppositions, if the BPatG invalidates a patent, it is invalid
since its grant date. The winning party of the invalidity proceeding can demand the reim-
bursement of legal costs from the losing party.
2.2 Interaction of Infringement and Invalidity Proceedings
If a patent is invalidated, any pending infringement proceedings based on the patent will
be dismissed.18 This still allows for situations where decisions on infringement can be (pre-
liminarily) enforced based on an invalid patent if infringement is decided before invalidity
is. The occurrence of such divergent decisions crucially depends on (a) the timing and (b)
duration of infringement and invalidity proceedings:
a) Mostly filed as a defensive reaction to an infringement action, validity challenges are
usually filed after the corresponding infringement proceedings.19 Figure 3 shows the
time lag between the filing of infringement and invalidity actions in our data. We
find that more than 55% of parallel invalidity proceedings are initiated at least four
months after the infringement proceeding.
b) Invalidity proceedings take significantly longer than infringement proceedings in first
instance (see Figure A-2), thus increasing the temporal spread between the decisions.
Taking into account a possible appeal, litigants have to expect a maximum of five to
seven years until a final judgment on an invalidity action is handed down. Opposi-
tion proceedings also take significantly longer than infringement proceedings. The
litigants may request acceleration of the proceeding, still, an opposition takes on av-
erage 20 to 30 months.20
In combination, a) and b) imply in practice that decisions on invalidity follow infringe-
ment decisions with a considerable lag.
The alleged infringer may request to stay the infringement proceeding until a decision
on validity is available (see Figure 1). In their decision to grant a stay, the judges of the
infringement courts attempt to strike a balance between the inherent conflict of interest
between the litigants.21 On the one hand, the alleged infringer may suffer irrecoverable
17von Hees and Braitmayer (2010) estimate that this is the case for 90% of all invalidity actions.
18If the patent is only partly invalid, the subject matter in pending infringement proceedings has to be
reconsidered on the basis of the amended patent. However, if the infringement proceeding is no longer
pending, the alleged infringer has to demand a reconsideration of the case on the basis of the amended
patent by filing a separate restitution action.
19This is often due to the time required to prepare the case, in particular the search for prior art that can
be used to challenge the patent’s validity (Kühnen, 2013).
20Harhoff et al. (2007) reports a median length of opposition proceedings at the EPO of about four years
(including appeal).
21For example, judges take the expected length of a stay into consideration when deciding whether to stay
infringement proceedings (Kaess, 2009). A stay is usually not granted if the prior art forwarded has already
been considered in the patent examination or any prior invalidity proceedings. Further factors taken into
consideration can be found in Harguth and Carlson (2011) and Kühnen (2012).
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Figure 1: Timing of infringement and invalidity proceedings in bifurcated and non-
bifurcated systems
Bifurcated Patent Litigation System (as practiced in Germany):
Invalidity
Infringement
Non-bifurcated Patent Litigation System:
Infringement + Invalidity
Judgment
Judgment
Filing of
Action
Filing of
Action
Stay Judgment
Appeal
Judgment
Filing of
Action
Invalidity
Defense
Judgment Appeal
Potential
Injuction Gap
damage if she is found to infringe an invalid patent. On the other hand, the delay of the
judgment on infringement can be considerable if a stay is granted. In this case, the patent
holder would be prevented from timely enforcement.
In practice, infringement courts rely by case law on a strong presumption of validity.
That is, infringement proceedings are only stayed if there is an overwhelmingly large prob-
ability that the patent will not be upheld in its current form. So, even though the judges at
the infringement courts do not consider the validity of the patent in their judgment on in-
fringement, they have to form an opinion on the likelihood of invalidity to decide on a stay
(Fock and Bartenbach, 2010). This poses a considerable challenge as infringement court
judges are rarely technically trained and limited resources restrict a thorough investigation
of the patent’s validity. Usually, the corresponding validity challenges are not yet at a stage
where they could provide guidance on the likelihood of invalidity.22 Infringement court
judges are therefore forced to stay at their own discretion.23
22With the Patent Law Revision Act introduced in 2009 the BPatG is now supposed to provide an interim
assessment of the patent’s validity as soon as possible. The infringement court, however, is not bound by the
assessment. Note that our data predate this revision of the law.
23Note that independently of the actual timing of the infringement and invalidity proceedings, the mere
jurisdictional separation creates an opportunity for litigants to construe patent claims differently. In this so-
called ‘Angora Cat’ approach the patent holder tries to make a patent’s claims look as broad as possible when
infringement is determined, the patent looks like a blow-dried, combed, fluffy cat; whereas when validity is
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3 Effects of Bifurcation
Proponents of bifurcation argue that exclusive jurisdiction on patent validity offers the ad-
vantage of specialization. The court charged with validity cases can train and deploy techni-
cal judges and accumulate experience specifically in the assessment of patent validity. This
should result in a coherent and well-founded claim construction and therefore increase le-
gal certainty regarding the validity of patents. Another argument in favor of bifurcation is
the ‘screening effect.’ Separate patent invalidity proceedings increase the costs and risks for
the alleged infringer. If the alleged infringer expects a patent to be upheld, she will refrain
from a validity challenge as defense to avoid further expenses. One might argue, there-
fore, a bifurcated system deters validity challenges with relatively low chances of success.
Perhaps the most important argument is that a strong presumption of validity, which puts
considerable faith in the pre-grant examination of patent offices, allows a fast assessment
of infringement claims because validity is not assessed simultaneously. In combination,
fast decisions on infringement, the screening of counterclaims for invalidity, as well as the
specialized institutions that decide on the technical question of validity, promise to lead to
fast, legally sound, and relatively cheap enforcement of patents (see e.g. Hilty and Lamping
(2011)).24
Opponents of bifurcation, however, argue that a system separating infringement and
invalidity proceedings is prone to legal discrepancies. We discuss this and several other
arguments below.
3.1 Divergent Decisions
Even though infringement and invalidity proceedings are heard and decided by different
courts, the decision on the patent’s validity has consequences for the decision on infringe-
ment – provided infringement was found. Once a patent is invalidated, this decision erodes
the legal basis for any claims for infringement. At the same time, because decisions on
infringement are usually made faster than decisions on validity, a court may establish in-
fringement although the patent is later invalidated. In fact, if infringement is found in first
instance, any injunction resulting from this decision is enforceable regardless of an appeal
or any pending validity challenge. This means the greater the temporal spread between
determined, he presents the claims as narrow as possible, the claims look like a wet, rolled-up cat. Patents
may therefore be found valid based on a narrow claim construction, while infringement is found on a broad
construction, which – if applied to validity – would have led to the invalidation of the patent. An analysis of
the ‘Angora Cat’ approach requires detailed legal comparisons of the claim construction in infringement and
invalidity proceedings, which is beyond the scope of our analysis.
24Some proponents of the bifurcated system also argue the temporal spread between the decision on in-
fringement and validity may benefit the alleged infringer if an action is stayed when it should not have been
stayed. This could work to the alleged infringer’s advantage if the regional court had most likely found in-
fringement, but the delay caused by a stay allows the alleged infringer to settle on favorable terms. The issue
only arises in the case the regional court finds infringement, but mistakenly decides to stay the case assuming
that the patent is likely to be invalidated. This is a Type II error, a court does not reject a request for a stay
when it should do so. This effect works in the opposite direction of the Type I error, that is, the regional court
does not grant a stay when it should do so. If, conditional on filing an invalidity case, the likelihood that
the patent in question is invalid exceeds the likelihood of the patent being upheld, the likelihood of a Type I
error exceeds that of a Type II error. This suggests that any potential benefits to infringers from a system that
minimizes the Type II error are lower than that of minimizing the Type I error.
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infringement and validity decisions, the longer a patent may be wrongfully enforced. Even
if the patent is invalidated in first instance, the patent holder can continue to enforce the
patent as long as the decision does not become binding. The injunction gap may, therefore,
extend beyond the first instance invalidity decision. This again creates strong incentives to
appeal the infringement decision while awaiting the outcome of the validity challenge. The
result is considerable legal uncertainty over the outcome of the infringement dispute, po-
tential delays in enforcement, increased litigation costs, and the possibility of an injunction
gap (an enforceable decision on infringement of an invalid patent – area A in Table 2).
Table 2: Divergent decisions
F Invalidity
In
fr
in
ge
m
en
t
No No Yes
No FIL FIL
Yes FIL A
Notes: The figure shows the share of cases where infringement was either found (Yes) or not (No) and where the patent was either
invalidated (Invalidity - Yes) or not (Invalidity - No). Area A shows the share of ‘invalid but infringed’ cases.
Two measures that counteract these factors are readily cited by the proponents of bifur-
cation (Pitz, 2011). First, the strict separation between infringement and validity can be
weakened by staying infringement proceedings until the invalidity or opposition outcome
becomes available. As mentioned above in Section 2.2, the problem with this mechanism
is that the infringement court has to form an opinion on the likelihood of the validity chal-
lenge without proper assessment. This may work in cases where the question of validity is
rather obvious, but it is doubtful that the infringement court judges’ educated guess cor-
rectly anticipates for what the technically trained judges at the BPatG (and DPMA/EPO)
need an extensive investigation. Second, the alleged infringer subject to a divergent de-
cision can obtain relief through appeal or a claim for restitution in case the patent holder
has exercised an injunction on the basis of the finding for infringement (Kühnen, 2009).
In this situation, the alleged infringer has also the right to demand compensation for ac-
crued losses. Compensation may reduce the direct harm caused by an injunction but some
injunctions such as rendering accounts to a competitor may cause irreparable damage (cf.
Ann et al. (2011)). Moreover, the mere possibility to be found to infringe an invalid patent
creates legal uncertainty among firms. A firm may decide for its own business dealings that
a given patent is invalid but it may still face a harmful injunction for the time being because
invalidity is not an admissible defense in infringement proceedings.
We assess the frequency of divergent decisions (i.e. the size of area A in Table 2) in the
German bifurcated patent system empirically by analyzing the timing of parallel proceed-
ings, the occurrence of divergent decisions and any observable trends over time, as well as
the share of divergent decisions that became legally binding.
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3.2 Screening
Proponents of bifurcation also argue that the separate filing of validity challenges act as a
filter deterring challenges with low probability of success. However, it is easy to turn the
argument on its head. There is a possibility that patents are not invalidated and held to
be infringed that would have been invalidated if scrutinized through an invalidity or oppo-
sition proceeding. Hence, the failure to challenge validity may harm the alleged infringer
directly but also has consequences beyond the dispute as the patent holder maintains the
ability to sue other parties with the valid patent. The main question is, therefore, why an
alleged infringer would refrain from challenging validity in a bifurcated system if chances of
seeing the patent invalidated are relatively large. For bifurcation to pivot the decision to file
a validity challenge, the additional cost involved in pursuing an essentially separate court
action and the added length of the dispute with the associated uncertainty about the ulti-
mate outcome may weigh heavier on certain types of firms than others. There is plenty of
evidence that smaller firms are more resource-constrained (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002;
Hall, 2002). This may imply that in particular smaller firms are less likely to challenge the
validity of a patent independent of the patent’s actual quality.
Figure 3 illustrates the consequence of such a screening mechanism. We see fewer
patents challenged, which biases downward the number of cases for which the patent is
found to be infringed although it would not be upheld if its validity was challenged. That
is, the share of cases where infringement was found but where the patent was eventually
invalidated (area A) is downward biased because area B is not subject to an invalidity pro-
ceeding.
Table 3: The screening effect of bifurcation
Challenged Not challenged
In
fr
in
ge
m
en
t
Invalidity
No No Yes FIL
No FIL
Yes FILL A B
Notes: The figure shows the share of cases where infringement was either found (Yes) or not (No) and where validity was either
challenged before the BPatG or the DPMA/EPO (Challenged) or not (Not Challenged) and where the patent was either invalidated
(Invalidity - Yes) or not (Invalidity - No). Area A shows the share of ‘invalid but infringed’ cases whereas area B shows the share of cases
that would fall into the ‘invalid but infringed’ category but validity is not challenged because of the screening mechanism described in
Section 3.2.
We investigate the existence of screening by estimating how the propensity to challenge
validity before the BPatG depends on the the size of the allegedly infringing firm. We as-
sume that smaller firms are more resource-constrained than larger firms. Hence, finding
smaller firms to be less likely to challenge the validity of an allegedly infringed patent while
controlling for time varying observable and time invariant unobservable patent-, case-, and
litigant-characteristics, offers evidence for the existence of a screening effect of bifurcation.
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3.3 Uncertainty and Changes in Opposition Behavior
Since we find that the ‘invalid but infringed’ situation arises in a substantial number of cases
(see Section 5.1), the question is whether the occurrence of an injunction gap affects firms
beyond the immediate consequences of facing an injunction on an invalid patent.
A possible effect could be a change in the firms’ opposition behavior. While opposi-
tions can be a reaction to the allegation of infringement, they are also considered common
precautionary means against newly granted patents of competitors. Compared to invalid-
ity proceedings, oppositions are cheap and for EP patents centralized at the EPO (Mejer
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2012). However, the main rationale is that firms can
curb uncertainty in the patent landscape prior to their own investments to commercialize
a technology. In this way, firms can prevent future infringement allegations that may lead
to unfavorable outcomes due to bifurcation.
We therefore test whether the opposition behavior of firms changes immediately after
they experience an injunction gap. We have data on the entire opposition history of firms
at the EPO and check if firms’ filing activities change within a one-year window following
the decision on validity (i.e. once they learn that they have been subject to an injunction
based on an invalid patent). To account for any general tendency to change opposition
filings following litigation, we match a control group of firms that was also involved in both
infringement and invalidity proceedings, but where proceedings did not yield divergent
decisions. This allows us to obtain difference-in-difference estimates of any effect of the
injunction gap on opposition filings. This offers evidence on any uncertainty created by
‘invalid but infringed’ decisions by testing whether firms change their efforts to restrict
such uncertainty immediately following an injunction gap.
4 Data
We use data on patent infringement and invalidity proceedings filed at German courts be-
tween 2000 and 2008. We also use data on opposition proceedings at the EPO and DPMA
for the same time period. We combine the case-level information with patent- and litigant-
level data.
4.1 Data Sources
Regional Courts – Infringement
We collected data on infringement actions directly from the three regional courts that deal
with the majority of patent infringement cases in Germany: the Regional Courts of Düs-
seldorf, Mannheim, and Munich I. We obtained detailed information on proceedings filed
during the time period 2000 to 2008. This provides us with a nine-year window but also
minimizes the number of cases that were still pending during the data collection.25
25Data collection started in Mannheim in spring 2010, in Munich in December 2010 and in Düsseldorf in
December 2011. On average seven junior lawyers (Referendare) were employed as research assistants at each
court to record the data directly from the dockets. Most research assistants had already passed the qualifying
examination that authorizes them to practice law in Germany. They also received specific training for the
data collection. Because case files are stored at the courts only in paper format, our research assistants had
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The information extracted for each case concerns procedural aspects, the identity of the
litigants and their legal representatives, and the patents at issue. Regarding procedural
aspects, we have data on the dates of filing, oral hearing, and judgment. We also obtained
information on how the proceedings in each instance ended, that is, by judgment, settle-
ment or withdrawal. We also have information on the claims made by the plaintiff and
the litigation value set by the court. Furthermore, the data include information on the
names and addresses of the plaintiffs and defendants, which allowed us to match corpo-
rate litigants to firm-level databases, including Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS, Compustat and
THOMSON One. This provides us with data on firm characteristics, including the number
of employees, total assets, turnover and industry.26 We also collected information on the
legal representatives of litigants. We used this information to create a binary variable that
indicates whether a litigant was represented in court by a ‘top’ law firm.27
With the patent application (or publication) numbers referenced in the case files, we
retrieved detailed information on the litigated patents from EPO’s Patstat.28 Patstat provides
us with information on application and publication dates, IPC classes,29 applicants and
inventors, family size,30 as well as forward and backward citations. On basis of the patent
numbers we constructed the respective patent families to obtain other European national as
well as EP equivalents in order to identify cases where a particular patent dispute spreads
across multiple national jurisdictions.31
Federal Patent Court – Invalidity
We also have information on invalidity proceedings before the BPatG and its appeal court,
the BGH. Both courts publish all decisions on validity since 2000 on their websites. We also
obtained information on the filing date as well as withdrawn actions in both instances from
the register of the German Patent and Trademark Office. This allowed us to construct the
course of the invalidity proceedings without having to access the case files at the courts.
That said, we do not have any information on the party challenging the patent because
the published decisions are anonymized. Therefore, we link infringement and invalidity
proceedings based on the patents involved. Earlier studies (cf. Stauder (1983)) and inter-
views with practitioners support our assumption that generally, the alleged infringer files
the invalidity action as a counterclaim to an infringement allegation.
To account for invalidity proceedings that are parallel to the infringement proceedings,
but which were filed either before or after the infringement claim was filed, our data on
invalidity proceedings cover the entire 1983 to 2012 period.
to digitize the relevant information directly at the regional courts. To retrieve all information in a systematic
manner, we created a common data template.
26The data also allow us to distinguish between natural and legal persons, such as firms, research institu-
tions, universities, and so on.
27We identified top law firms in patent litigation according to a ranking of leading law firms published in
2009 (Top 50 law firms in patent litigation & patent applications in Germany) by the legal professional journal
JUVE Rechtsmarkt.
28We use the Patstat version October 2012.
29The International Patent Classification (IPC) is a hierarchical system of symbols for the classification of
patents according to different technology areas.
30The family size of a patent is computed as the number of jurisdictions in which patent protection was
sought for the same invention.
31Details on the identification of multi-jurisdictional patent disputes can be found in Cremers et al. (2013).
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EPO and DPMA – Opposition
We have data on any prior or parallel opposition of the patents involved in an infringe-
ment action. For DE patents we have information on the opposition proceeding, i.e. the
opposition’s filing and end dates as well as outcome, from the register of the DPMA. We
constructed data on oppositions at the EPO based on legal status information from Patstat
covering 1981 to 2012. In contrast to the data from the DPMA, the data for oppositions
at the EPO have information on the identity of the opponent, that is, the party filing the
opposition.
We linked the opposition data in the following ways with the litigation dataset. First, we
added information on any opposition to the patents involved in an infringement proceed-
ing to identify parallel invalidity proceedings in form of oppositions and to construct each
patent’s history of validity challenges. Second, we manually identified the litigants from
the infringement proceedings among all opponents of EP patents to capture the opposition
behavior of the alleged infringers over time. We also matched the opponents with firm-level
data from Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS.
4.2 Sample Description
The patent litigation actions collected at the Regional Courts of Mannheim, Düsseldorf,
and Munich cover around 80% of all patent infringement cases during the period 2000
to 2008.32 In total, we have data for 5,121 litigation cases. We identify and drop cases
from our dataset that involve a patent, but that are not directly concerned with infringe-
ment.33 We also drop cases involving utility models because the bifurcation principle only
applies to invention patents. Furthermore, to avoid misinterpretation of case outcomes,
we also remove a small number of negative declaratory actions and cases where the court
decides only on issues regarding the enforcement of a previous judgment (e.g. the amount
of damages granted). The resulting sample contains 3,375 patent infringement cases. As
some actions are filed on the basis of more than one patent, our sample contains 3,711
patent-case observations.
For the time period 2000 to 2008 our data count 1,822 invalidity actions filed at the
Federal Patent Court.34 We also have recent data on all oppositions filed at the EPO between
1981 and 2012. These data cover oppositions to the grant of 68,259 EP patents.35
Figure 2 shows the number of infringement and invalidity actions as well as oppositions
by year. There has been an increase in case numbers over time.36 The figure also shows
that the majority of parallel validity callenges are invalidity actions filed before the BPatG.
Only 31.6% of validity challenges are oppositions. The share of infringement cases with
32We estimate that roughly half of the remaining 20% of cases are spread over the other nine regional
courts. However, these courts are of minor importance and reputation.
33This includes employee invention disputes, licensing and patent transfer disputes, as well as patent arro-
gations and false marking.
34As parallel invalidity proceedings may be filed either before or after this time frame, we identified all
invalidity actions filed against patents involved in an infringement proceeding and added these to our data.
For more details and a breakdown of court cases by court see Cremers et al. (2013).
35For oppositions to the grant of DE patents, we obtained only data for our sample of patents that are
involved in infringement actions.
36The dip in 2002 is due to an internal decision at the regional court in Düsseldorf to remove and destroy
files and only store decisions in the court archive. Fortunately, this decision affected only our data for 2002.
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Figure 2: Incidence of infringement and parallel invalidity proceedings
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parallel invalidity proceedings or oppositions is around 44.3% over the entire 2000 to 2008
period.
5 Results
5.1 Divergent decisions
As a first step, we assess the frequency of cases where a patent was ‘invalid but infringed.’
One of the factors mentioned in Section 2 above that contributes to the occurrence of diver-
gent decisions is the temporal spread between infringement and validity challenges. Figure
3 shows the distribution of gaps between the filing of infringement and invalidity actions.
The figure shows that in most cases the invalidity action followed its corresponding infringe-
ment action. As invalidity proceedings take on average longer, too (see Figure A-2 in the
Appendix), the infringement decision is usually handed down first, despite the possibility
to have the infringement proceeding stayed. Figure A-3 in the Appendix shows the distri-
bution of gaps between infringement actions and oppositions. Here, oppositions are largely
initiated before the infringement action, suggesting that oppositions are used preemptively
rather than reactively. Still, the (first instance) decision on validity is taken on average 6.7
months after the (first instance) decision on infringement. This shows that there is substan-
tial scope for an injunction gap, that is, in case a patent is found to be infringed, the patent
holder has on average 6.7 months to enforce the patent even if the patent is invalidated
once the BPatG (invalidity) or DPMA and EPO (opposition) hand down their decision.
Table 4 cross-tabulates the (first instance) infringement and invalidity outcomes for all
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Figure 3: Timing of infringement and invalidity actions in parallel proceedings
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1,154 parallel cases where the decision on infringement was handed down first.37 The gray-
shaded cells in Table 4 show that there is a sizeable number of cases where the patent was
first found to be infringed and later invalidated by the BPatG or the DPMA/EPO. If we also
consider cases where the patent was partly invalidated or infringed, there is a total of 142
cases. For comparison, in only 75 cases patents that were found to be (partly) infringed
were upheld in the invalidity proceeding. This means that slightly more than 12.3% of
cases (including cases that settled) produce divergent decisions – the patent is first found
to be infringed but later invalidated.38 We also observe 167 cases where the patent was
found (partly) infringed and the parallel invalidity proceeding subsequently ended with a
withdrawal of the action.39
Figure 4 shows the length of the injunction gap for the 142 cases with divergent de-
cisions. The figure distinguishes between invalidity decisions through the opposition divi-
sions of the DPMA/EPO and the BPatG. The median injunction gap for cases in which the
infringed patent was eventually invalidated by the BPatG is about 13.5 months. Hence,
parties that have won the infringement case have little over a year to enforce a patent that
should not have been granted in the first place.40 The length of the injunction gap is signifi-
cantly longer for cases in which the patent was invalidated through opposition procedures.
The median is 33.5 months. As shown in Figure 4, the main reason for this is that there
37Table A-1 in the Appendix shows the cases where invalidity was decided first.
38Figure A-4 in the Appendix shows the occurrence of divergent decisions over time.
39Figure A-5 in the Appendix shows that the majority of these cases ended in a settlement shortly after the
infringement decision.
40Considering that appellate invalidity proceedings take several years, the actual injunction gap until the
decision on the patent’s invalidity is binding may be considerably longer.
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Table 4: Comparing outcomes of infringement and invalidity proceedings where infringe-
ment was decided first
Outcome parallel invalidity proceeding
Outcome LG valid partly
invalid
invalid withdrawn Total
infringed 55 50 53 120 278
42.6% 24.0% 25.2% 19.8% 24.1%
partly infringed 20 21 18 47 106
15.5% 10.1% 8.6% 7.7% 9.2%
not infringed 23 45 55 70 193
17.8% 21.6% 26.2% 11.5% 16.7%
settlement 31 92 84 370 577
24.0% 44.2% 40.0% 61.0% 50.0%
Total 129 208 210 607 1154
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Notes: Dark gray-shaded area shows clear divergent decisions. Light gray-shaded area shows presumed divergent decisions. The sample
consists of all infringement proceedings with a parallel invalidity proceeding and where the first instance infringement outcome is first. In
case of multiple invalidity decisions, the fastest decision is chosen. The unit of observation is the patent in the infringement proceedings.
are a considerable number of opposition proceedings that take a lot longer to reach a final
decision than invalidity proceedings at the BPatG.
As explained in Section 2, the judgment by the infringement court is (preliminary) en-
forceable despite a pending decision on validity. The only way to prevent an injunction
from taking binding effect is to appeal the judgment. In fact, we observe an appeal rate of
54.0% for cases with a parallel invalidity proceeding compared to 26.2% for cases with no
parallel invalidity proceeding (see Table A-2 in the Appendix).41 Table 5 takes a look at the
final outcomes of cases with divergent decisions (Figure A-6 in the Appendix shows a more
detailed breakdown). The table shows that in 43.7% of cases with divergent decisions in
first instance, the divergent decision is upheld upon appeal. In 13 cases, the court upheld
the patent on appeal, which means the defendant in the infringement proceeding is indeed
infringing a (partly) valid patent.42 It bears mentioning that a substantial number of cases
is settled during appeal. It is difficult to interpret these numbers, but the fact that the share
of settled infringement cases (37.3%) is three times as large as the share of settled invalid-
ity cases (12.0%) suggests that firms that have been found to infringe a patent are likely to
settle (presumably on terms favorable to the patent holder).
Table 6 shows a comparison of case-, litigant-, and patent-level characteristics between
defendants in infringement cases that were subject to divergent decisions and all other cases
with ‘non-divergent’ outcomes. The litigation value does not differ significantly between
41This hints at the possibility that the appeal rate is higher in a bifurcated system than in a non-bifurcated
system. An appeal to an infringement decision may be useful – regardless of its prospects of success – in order
to delay an injunction while the decision on validity is still pending.
42We have only incomplete information on the timing of the infringement decision in second instance rel-
ative to the invalidity decision. It may be the case that the appeals court did not wait until the decision on
validity was available, although infringement proceedings are more likely to be stayed in second instance.
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Figure 4: Length of injunction gap for divergent decisions
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Notes: The figure shows all divergent decisions regardless of whether parties have (preliminarily) enforced the infringement judgment.
Table 5: Final outcome to divergent decisions
Invalidity outcome
Infringement outcome reversed settled binding Total
reversed 2 0 6 8
1.4% 0.0% 4.2% 5.6%
settled 8 11 34 53
5.6% 7.8% 23.9% 37.3%
binding 13 6 62 81
9.1% 4.2% 43.7% 57.0%
Total 23 17 102 142
16.2% 12.0% 71.8% 100.0%
Notes: Sample: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings with a divergent decision. The unit of observation is the patent
in each infringement proceeding. The observable outcome of oppositions is by definition binding. Settlements are broadly defined and
include withdrawn appeals.
White area: divergent decisions eventually reversed by the respective appeals court.
Light gray-shaded area: divergent decisions where at least one appeal proceeding ended with a settlement.
Dark gray-shaded area: divergent decisions that remained unaltered due to lack of appeal or an affirmative decision by the appeals court.
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divergent and non-divergent decisions, that is, there is no evidence for disproportionately
many low-value cases ending up in an injunction gap. That said, we find that validity chal-
lenges in cases with divergent decisions are filed on average three months later than in
cases with non-divergent decisions. This can be interpreted in different ways. The infringe-
ment court may reject requests for a stay more often if the validity challenge has been filed
with considerable delay or that a longer preparation of a validity challenge may increase
chances of success. In any case it shows that the temporal separation of infringement and
invalidity proceedings contributes to divergent outcomes. When we look at the size of the
defendants in the infringement cases in the two groups, there appears to be slightly more
small firms in the divergent decision group on the one hand and more large firms in the
non-divergent decision group on the other. We also see a larger share of patents on ‘instru-
ments’ in the group of divergent decisions. Most of these cases involve patents on medical
device technology. At the same time, there are a lot fewer cases in ‘electrical engineering’.43
Interestingly, we do not observe a significant difference in the representation of top law
firms before court.
5.2 Screening
Figure 2 shows that slightly less than a third of infringement cases (counted at the patent-
level) are associated with an invalidity action or opposition. This figure is low compared
to litigation systems where infringement and invalidity are decided simultaneously in the
same proceeding. In non-bifurcated litigation systems, a counterclaim for invalidity is a
standard defense to alleged infringement. Therefore, the low figure in our German data
hints at self-selection among litigants.
As discussed in Section 3.2 above, proponents of bifurcation argue that the added costs
and complexity of filing a claim for invalidity with the BPatG provides a mechanism that
deters validity challenges that have a low probability of success and hence helps a speedy
resolution of the infringement case.44 Alternatively, one could argue that the added costs
and complexity impede firms that are more resource-constrained from contesting validity
despite reasonable chances of seeing the patent invalidated. Moreover, the fact that the
validity challenge loses some of its ‘effectiveness,’ as the invalidity decision is usually handed
down after the infringement decision, may deter firms from filing an invalidity action in the
first place.
We test this hypothesis by estimating the propensity that the alleged infringer files an
invalidity action at the BPatG. That is, we predict the probability that the validity of a patent
involved in an infringement case is also challenged at the BPatG. We include a number of
patent-, case-, and litigant-characteristics among the regressors (for summary statistics see
Table A-2 in the Appendix). The regressions also include year, patent technology class, and
court dummies. Table 7 shows the results.
Our focus is on the size of the alleged infringers, which have to decide whether to chal-
lenge the validity of the allegedly infringed patents before the BPatG. We distinguish be-
43Covering infringement actions filed between 2000 to 2008, our data do not contain the recent cases
related to the smartphone patent wars cited in the Introduction.
44If the infringement case is heard by a regional court other than the Regional Court in Munich, this also
means that the alleged infringer has to litigate in two different geographical venues (the BPatG is in Munich).
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Table 6: Comparison of alleged infringers by decision
Decision type
Non-divergent Divergent
Variables Mean Mean SE mean
diff.
Signif.
Alleged infringer
Micro 0.11 0.13 0.029
Small 0.14 0.25 0.032 ∗∗
Medium 0.22 0.25 0.037
Large 0.52 0.38 0.045 ∗∗
Germany 0.85 0.88 0.031
Europe (excl. Germany) 0.10 0.08 0.026
World (excl. Europe) 0.05 0.04 0.019
Top legal representative 0.55 0.63 0.044
Proceeding
Litigation value (in th €) 1190.75 995.65 246.790
Lag of invalidity action (in months) 3.76 6.46 0.907 ∗∗
Lag of opposition (in months) -6.83 -6.84 1.570
Technological area
Electrical engineering 0.28 0.14 0.039 ∗∗∗
Instruments 0.13 0.22 0.031 ∗∗
Chemistry 0.15 0.20 0.033
Mechanical engineering 0.29 0.29 0.041
Other 0.15 0.15 0.032
Observations 998 142
Notes: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings with parallel invalidity proceedings or oppositions regardless of the timing
of the decisions. The unit of observation is the patent in each infringement proceeding. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 7: Probit regression results: incidence of invalidity action
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Action filed Action filed Action filed Action filed
Alleged infringer
Small (d) 0.117∗∗ (0.04) 0.111∗ (0.04) 0.096∗ (0.04) 0.086 (0.04)
Medium (d) 0.118∗∗ (0.04) 0.119∗∗ (0.04) 0.109∗∗ (0.04) 0.109∗∗ (0.04)
Large (d) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.186∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.137∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.127∗∗∗ (0.04)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) -0.103∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.093∗∗ (0.03)
World (excl. Europe) (d) -0.168∗∗∗ (0.04) -0.153∗∗∗ (0.04)
Top legal representative (d) 0.122∗∗∗ (0.02)
Patent holder
Non-practicing entity (d) -0.041 (0.04) -0.035 (0.04) -0.026 (0.04)
Small (d) -0.025 (0.05) -0.021 (0.05) -0.028 (0.05)
Medium (d) -0.034 (0.04) -0.033 (0.04) -0.039 (0.04)
Large (d) -0.014 (0.04) -0.027 (0.04) -0.031 (0.04)
Europe (excl. Germany) (d) 0.013 (0.03) -0.004 (0.03)
World (excl. Europe) (d) -0.120∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.108∗∗ (0.03)
Patent characteristics
Forward citations (in first 5 years) 0.000 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00)
EP (d) -0.053 (0.03) -0.083∗∗ (0.03)
Accelerated examination requested (d) 0.093∗∗ (0.03)
Grant lag (difference from mean in days) -0.000∗∗ (0.00)
Age of patent (in years) -0.005∗ (0.00) 0.011 (0.01) 0.025 (0.01)
Age of patent (in years, squared) -0.001 (0.00) -0.001∗ (0.00)
Invalidity history
Patent solidifed through opp. proc. (d) 0.085∗∗ (0.03) 0.075∗∗ (0.03) 0.066∗ (0.03) 0.049 (0.03)
Patent challenged through inv. proc. (d) -0.050 (0.03) 0.037 (0.04) 0.044 (0.04) 0.064 (0.05)
Patent solidifed through inv. proc. (d) -0.221∗∗∗ (0.05) -0.209∗∗∗ (0.05) -0.230∗∗∗ (0.05)
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding (d) -0.192∗∗∗ (0.04) -0.204∗∗∗ (0.04) -0.223∗∗∗ (0.03)
Litigation value (in th €) -0.000 (0.00)
Litigation value (in th €, log) 0.032∗∗ (0.01) 0.035∗∗∗ (0.01)
Multi-jurisdictional litigation (d) 0.110 (0.06)
Controls
Year effects Yes No No Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court effects No Yes Yes Yes
Patent characteristics Yes No Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.036 0.061 0.091
Observations 2316 2303 2302 2299
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings with a duration of at least 120 days. The unit of observation is at the patent-
case level, that is each patent in each infringement proceeding is treated as a separate case. Baseline patent holder size: micro. Baseline
alleged infringer size: micro. 22
tween four size categories: micro, small, medium and large.45 The results for our preferred
specification in Column (4) show that medium-sized and large firms are about 12% more
likely to file an invalidity action at the BPatG than micro-sized alleged infringers. This sug-
gests that after accounting for time varying and invariant patent- and case-characteristics,
smaller defendants in infringement proceedings are less likely to challenge the validity of
the patent at issue. In contrast, there is no evidence that the size of the plaintiff in the in-
fringement proceedings, that is the patent holder, plays any role in the decision to challenge
the patent’s validity. This supports the view that the decision not to file a parallel action
at the BPatG is at least partly determined by resource constraints on the alleged infringer’s
side.
The results also show that firms that are not registered in Germany are less likely to
challenge a patent’s validity. Firms in a European country other than Germany are 9.3%
less likely to file a parallel action and firms outside of Europe are 15.3% less likely than
German firms to file an invalidity action. This may be explained by larger costs involved
for parties outside of Germany in pursuing an additional action at the BPatG. For example,
since the court action is conducted in German, translation costs accrue and in most cases
representation has to be assigned to a German law firm. In line with this reasoning, we find
that cases in which the alleged infringer is represented by a top law firm to be 12% more
likely to have a parallel invalidity proceeding.
To explore this ‘screening’ effect of bifurcation further, we use propensity score match-
ing. We estimate the propensity that a parallel invalidity action is pursued at the BPatG by
a small or large defendant in an infringement case. In contrast to Table 7, for the propen-
sity matching estimation, we collapse the data into two firm size categories: micro-small
and medium-large. The results in Table 8 echo the probit results of Table 7.46 Large and
medium-sized firms have a higher likelihood of pursuing an invalidity action than micro and
small firms, all else equal. This result holds regardless of the way we match treated and
control units (propensity score or nearest neighbor) and the number of matched controls (1
or 5). The lower part of Table 8 also shows results when excluding non-European alleged
infringers. The average treatment effects are slightly larger in magnitude but overall very
similar to the results obtained for the full sample.
These results provide evidence in favor of a screening effect of bifurcation. More resource-
constrained firms are less likely to file an invalidity action in response to an infringement
claim. In line with our discussion in Section 3.2, this means that the 12.3% of ‘invalid but
infringed’ cases shown in Section 5.1 are downward biased. Fewer patents are in fact in-
validated than in the absence of the additional costs engendered by bifurcation. This also
contributes to the strong presumption of validity in a self-enforcing way.
5.3 Uncertainty and the Effect of Divergent Decisions on Oppositions
Empirically it is difficult to gauge the effect that a divergent decision has on the alleged
infringers. If the infringement decision is indeed enforced while the decision on invalidity is
pending, it is reasonable to expect some direct negative effect. Apart from any direct effects
of an injunction, firms may also adjust their expectations about facing an injunction despite
45The size categories are defined according to the EU definition, which relies on information on a firm’s
number of employees, turnover, and total assets.
46Figure A-7 in the Appendix shows that treated and control units have common support.
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Table 8: Estimation of average treatment effects
Propensity Score Matching Nearest Neighbor Matching
Matches per observation nn=1 nn=5 nn=1 nn=5
Full sample (N=2,193)
ATE action filed 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10
Std. err. 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000
Matches minimum 1 5 1 5
Matches maximum 5 7 3 7
European alleged infringers (N=2,069)
ATE action filed 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11
Std. err. 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
P-value 0.026 0.002 0.005 0.000
Matches minimum 1 5 1 5
Matches maximum 3 7 3 7
Notes: The sample consists of all infringement proceedings with a duration of at least 120 days. The unit of observation is at the
patent-case level, that is each patent in each infringement proceeding is treated as a separate case. Cases with a patent belonging to
a technological class with fewer than five patents in the entire sample are excluded. ATE: average treatment effect. Treatment model:
logit. Distance metric: Mahalanobis.
the invalidity of a patent. Such uncertainty about the likelihood of infringing a patent right
may affect a firm’s behavior beyond the immediate direct effect of the injunction. Not unlike
a burnt child dreading the fire, we analyze whether firms try to avoid repeated exposure to
divergent decisions by adjusting their opposition behavior.
There is reason to believe that a bifurcated litigation system increases a firm’s incentives
to reduce uncertainty by attempting to eliminate patents early on through oppositions.
Figure A-8 in the Appendix shows that German entities are in fact responsible for more than
half of all opposition proceedings before the EPO between 1997 and 2013. This suggests
that German firms oppose disproportionately more patents at the EPO than firms from other
countries.
Oppositions are a relatively cheap and effective means to clearing potentially harmful
patents early on. Once they are found to infringe an invalid patent, firms may file more
oppositions against patents to preempt the risk of future infringement allegations. We test
for an increase in opposition filings by conducting an event-study analysis: we regress the
number of oppositions by a firm that has faced an injunction gap on a dummy variable
that is equal to one once the decision on validity is handed down and it becomes apparent
that the regional court had held an invalid patent infringed (diff-specification). We use a
±6 months window to assess changes in opposition behavior. To account for any general
tendency for firms to change their opposition behavior following an infringement dispute,
we match the set of firms that were subject to divergent decisions to the set of firms that
filed a validity challenge but were not subject to divergent decisions. The interaction term
of the dummy variable indicating whether a firm was subject to a divergent decision and
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the dummy variable indicating the timing of the decision provides therefore a differences-
in-differences estimate of any effect on firms’ opposition activity (diff-in-diff specification).
Table 9 shows the main results. We find a positive coefficient for the interaction term as
well as for the ‘post-invalidity decision’ dummy. This suggests that firms that were accused
of patent infringement generally increase their oppositions following the conclusion of the
proceeding. This increase in oppositions is, however, stronger for firms that were found to
have infringed an invalid patent. The results in Table 9 focus on a ±6 month window; Table
A-3 in the Appendix shows differences in means before and after a case is decided also for
±2 and ±12 month windows. The figures for the alternative event windows are consistent
with the data shown for the ±6 month window.
Table 9: Opposition behavior pre/post-invalidity decision
diff-specification diff-in-diff specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oppositions Oppositions Oppositions Oppositions
±6 months
Post-invalidity decision 0.426∗∗∗ (0.10) 1.504∗∗∗ (0.43) 0.531∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.532∗∗∗ (0.16)
Post-inval. x infringed 1.047∗∗ (0.39) 1.048∗∗ (0.39)
No. of filed patents -0.001 (0.00)
Opponent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects No No Yes Yes
Opponents with divergent decision 20 20 20 20
Opponents with non-divergent decision 97 0 97 97
Observations 702 120 702 702
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Fixed effect negative binomial regression. Dependent variable number of oppositions filed by alleged infringer. Date of invalidity
decision defined as publication of decision by the BPatG (for invalidity proceedings) and the DPMA/EPO (for oppositions). Alleged
infringers with no oppositions after invalidity decision excluded.
These findings are in line with Adam and Spence (2001) who argue that the dispro-
portionate share of oppositions at the EPO by German firms is due to the need to preempt
infringement actions in the German bifurcated patent litigation system.47 Our results, there-
fore, suggest that the relatively large number of oppositions by German firms is at least in
part a manifestation of the uncertainty created by bifurcation.
47There are two alternative, although not mutually exclusive explanations for the observed increase in
opposition activity (Harhoff, 2005). First, oppositions may not only serve to preempt specific infringement
allegations, but also to develop a reputation for toughness, i.e. to go the whole nine yards in challenging
a patent’s validity. Second, the alleged infringer may have obtained information (e.g. prior art) during the
invalidity proceeding that can be used as evidence against other patents. Note that because in our data
the alleged infringer does not file a disproportionate number of oppositions against the patent holder of the
infringement proceeding, some form of retaliation is an unlikely reason for the increase in opposition activity.
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6 Conclusion
Overall, our results suggest that the German bifurcated patent system favors strongly the
patent holder in litigation. We show that the bifurcated system creates a substantial num-
ber of cases where an invalid patent is held infringed. We also provide evidence that fewer
patents are challenged than what we would expect based on the consideration of litigation
systems where infringement and validity are dealt with jointly. This means that the num-
ber of ‘invalid but infringed’ cases is presumably biased downwards due to self-selection.
Our results also indicate that the possibility of facing an injunction for infringing an invalid
patent creates legal uncertainty. We find evidence for such legal uncertainty by looking at
changes in firms’ opposition behavior following directly a divergent decision. We find that
alleged infringers that were subject to a divergent decision file more oppositions immedi-
ately following the court case.
Our results provide empirical support for the criticism that has been directed at bifurca-
tion (Hilty and Lamping, 2011; Münster-Horstkotte, 2012). Given the probabilistic nature
of patents, the strong presumption of validity that is at the core of Germany’s bifurcated
enforcement system favors the patentee and creates uncertainty for potential infringers.
That said, the problems revealed by our analysis should be compared to possible benefits of
bifurcation – in particular, the impact of technically trained judges at the BPatG on validity
decisions and the lower costs of litigation due to less need for technical expert witnesses.
Indeed, the costs of litigation in Germany are remarkably low compared to for example the
UK,48 but technically trained judges could also be incorporated in a court system in which
validity and infringement are decided jointly, as is the case in Switzerland (Ann, 2011). It is
also possible that reforms that increased case loads at the BPatG and its appeal court, BGH,
aggravated the problems during our period of analysis. Regardless, our results suggest that
the current system is in danger of overly favoring patent holders. One way of addressing
the problems highlighted by our analysis could be an acceleration of proceedings at the
BPatG, thereby either avoiding the injunction gap altogether or trimming its length. This
could allow attaining the benefits of bifurcation while avoiding the uncertainty created by
‘invalid but infringed’ decisions. Alternatively bifurcation could be abandoned altogether.
While such a drastic step may look appealing to some observers, its impact would be uncer-
tain. It might for example encourage forum shopping. If courts depend on the number of
cases they hear for fee income, prestige, etc. patent holders might find themselves again at
an advantage. In any case, we do not present a counterfactual analysis that would allow us
to evaluate such a drastic step. Our analysis still suggests that bifurcation has considerable
drawbacks, at least the way it is currently implemented in the German enforcement system.
48That said, low litigation costs are also a characteristic of the French and the Dutch patent litigation systems
which are not bifurcated (Cremers et al., 2013).
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A Appendix: Figures
Figure A-1: Court structure in Germany’s patent litigation system (Cremers et al., 2013,
amended)
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Figure A-2: Length of (first instance) infringement proceedings and invalidity proceedings
by year
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Figure A-3: Timing of infringement and oppositions in parallel proceedings
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Figure A-4: Number and share of divergent decisions over time
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Figure A-5: Time between infringement decision (first instance) and settlement in parallel
invalidity proceeding
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Figure A-6: Appeals and settlements of divergent decision cases
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Figure A-7: Distribution of estimated propensity scores
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Figure A-8: Oppositions filed against EP patents 1997-2013
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B Appendix: Tables
Table A-1: Comparing outcomes of infringement and invalidity proceedings where invalid-
ity was decided first
Outcome parallel invalidity proceeding
Outcome LG valid partly
invalid
invalid withdrawn Total
infringed 22 14 5 41 82
31.9% 16.3% 4.0% 27.0% 19.0%
partly infringed 8 9 3 2 22
11.6% 10.5% 2.4% 1.3% 5.1%
not infringed 9 19 29 8 65
13.0% 22.1% 23.2% 5.3% 15.0%
settlement 30 44 88 101 263
43.5% 51.2% 70.4% 66.4% 60.9%
Total 69 86 125 152 432
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Notes: Gray-shaded areas show divergent decisions. The sample consists of all infringement proceedings with
a parallel invalidity proceeding and where the first instance infringement outcome is first. In case of multiple
invalidity decisions, the fastest decision is chosen. The unit of observation is the patent in the infringement
proceedings. Occurrence of divergent decisions explained by multiple patents in same proceeding, appeal to
invalidity decision, or missing defense by alleged infringer.
Table A-2: Summary statistics grouped by parallel invalidity proceeding
No parallel invalidity proceeding Parallel invalidity proceeding
Variables Mean Std. err. Min Max Mean Std. err. Min Max
Patent characteristics
No. of inventors 1.87 1.35 0 9 1.89 1.40 0 19
Backward citations 4.74 2.89 0 27 5.42 3.44 0 32
Forward citations (in first 5 years) 3.30 4.93 0 44 5.32 6.18 0 51
Non-patent literature 0.83 1.97 0 21 1.65 2.47 0 18
IPC subclass count 2.24 1.90 1 9 3.32 2.94 1 9
Family size (INPADOC) 11.61 16.39 1 183 20.62 24.75 1 69
Non-patent literature ratio 0.12 0.23 0 1 0.17 0.23 0 1
EP 0.77 0.42 0 1 0.78 0.42 0 1
PCT filing 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1
Year of patent application/priority 1992.50 4.88 1980 2004 1992.28 4.37 1979 2005
Accelerated examination requested 0.12 0.33 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
Grant lag (difference from mean in days) 69.56 726.10 -1193 4641 21.06 601.81 -1303 4004
Age of patent (in years) 12.18 4.78 1 25 12.54 4.49 1 23
Technology area
Electrical engineering 0.32 0.47 0 1 0.38 0.49 0 1
Instruments 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.12 0.33 0 1
Chemistry 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.13 0.33 0 1
Continued on next page
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Table A-2 – continued from previous page
No parallel invalidity proceeding Parallel invalidity proceeding
Variables Mean Std. err. Min Max Mean Std. err. Min Max
Mechanical engineering 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Other 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1
Invalidity history
Patent solidifed through opposition proc. 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1
Patent challenged through inv. proc. 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1
Patent solidifed through inv. proc. 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.01 0.11 0 1
Proceeding
Parallel opposition proceeding 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.02 0.15 0 1
Year of infringement action 2004.77 2.53 2000 2008 2004.93 2.35 2000 2008
Litigation value (in th €) 1292.62 3021.39 0 38348 1082.32 2807.63 0 35000
Length of proceeding (months) 10.79 11.07 0 128 17.43 16.65 0 128
Parallel opposition proceeding 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.02 0.15 0 1
Multi-jurisdictional litigation 0.03 0.16 0 1 0.04 0.20 0 1
LG Düsseldorf 0.68 0.47 0 1 0.58 0.49 0 1
LG Mannheim 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.36 0.48 0 1
LG Munich 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1
LG judgment appealed 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.54 0.50 0 1
Alleged infringer
Micro 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.17 0.38 0 1
Small 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1
Medium 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Large 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1
Germany 0.72 0.45 0 1 0.83 0.38 0 1
Europe (excl. Germany) 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1
World (excl. Europe) 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.07 0.25 0 1
Top legal representative 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.52 0.50 0 1
Patent holder
Non-practicing entity 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.29 0.45 0 1
Micro 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1
Small 0.10 0.29 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1
Medium 0.16 0.36 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
Large 0.61 0.49 0 1 0.67 0.47 0 1
Germany 0.69 0.46 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1
Europe (excl. Germany) 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1
World (excl. Europe) 0.12 0.33 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1
Top legal representative 0.67 0.47 0 1 0.60 0.49 0 1
vii
Table A-3: Comparison of oppositions by alleged infringers at the EPO
Before After SE
mean diff.
Opponents with non-divergent decisions
±2 months
Filed patents 11.00 13.26 3.150
Filed oppositions 0.22 0.26 0.074
±6 months
Filed patents 34.60 36.99 8.970
Filed oppositions 0.75 0.81 0.241
±12 months
Filed patents 72.16 71.63 17.653
Filed oppositions 1.52 1.67 0.489
Opponents with divergent decisions
±2 months
Filed patents 7.05 9.46 4.840
Filed oppositions 0.10 0.34 0.128
±6 months
Filed patents 19.07 22.56 11.638
Filed oppositions 0.27 0.85 0.238
±12 months
Filed patents 39.95 45.07 23.404
Filed oppositions 1.17 1.41 0.462
Notes: The sample consists of all alleged infringers that have filed at least one opposition against an EP patent twelve months before or
after a decision in the parallel invalidity proceeding.
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